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Duquesne Law Review
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Curtis v. Kline: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Declares Act 62 Unconstitutional-A Triumph for
Equal Protection Law
Hon. Vincent A. Cirillo*
INTRODUCTION
In response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Blue v. Blue,' Pennsylvania's General Assembly enacted a
college support law, "Act 62."2 Launching much debate, Act 62
* Judge, Superior Court of Pennsylvania. B.A., Villanova University, 1951;
LL.B., Temple University School of Law, 1955, converted to J.D., 1969. The author
wishes to acknowledge the assistance of his law clerks: Lisa A. Quasti, Colleen E.
Kadel, Brooks R. Foland, and Thomas & Strohmetz.
1. 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deferred to
the General Assembly on the issue of whether to impose a legal duty of
postsecondary educational support: "Since our legislature has taken an active role in
domestic matters through amendments and reenactment of the Divorce Code and
the Domestic Relations Act, we feel the more prudent course is to await guidance
from that body rather than creating duties and obligations by judicial pronounce-
ment." Blue, 616 A.2d at 632.
2. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4327 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
The text of the statute is as follows:
§ 4327. Postsecondary educational costs
(a) General rule.-Where applicable under this section, a court may order
either or both parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise
subject to an existing support obligation to provide equitably for educational
costs of their child whether an application for this support is made before or
after the child has reached 18 years of age. The responsibility to provide for
postsecondary educational expenses is a shared responsibility between both
parents. The duty of a parent to provide a postsecondary education for a
child is not as exacting a requirement as the duty to provide food, clothing
and shelter for a child of tender years unable to support himself. This
authority shall extend to postsecondary education, including periods of under-
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graduate or vocational education after the child graduates from high school.
An award for postsecondary educational costs may be entered only after the
child or student has made reasonable efforts to apply for scholarships, grants
and work-study assistance.
(b) Action to recover educational expenses.-An action to recover educational
costs may be commenced:
(1) by the student if over 18 years of age; or
(2) by either parent on behalf of a child under 18 years of age, but, if
the student is over 18 years of age, the student's written consent to
the action must be secured.
(c) Calculation of educational costs.-In making an award under this section,
the court shall calculate educational costs as defined in this section.
(d) Grants and scholarships.-The court shall deduct from the educational
costs all grants and scholarships awarded to the student.
(e) Other relevant factors.-After calculating educational costs and deducting
grants and scholarships, the court may order either parent or both parents to
pay all or part of the remaining educational costs of their child. The court
shall consider all relevant factors which appear reasonable, equitable and
necessary, including the following:
(1) The financial resources of both parents.
(2) The financial resources of the student.
(3) The receipt of educational loans and other financial assistance by
the student.
(4) The ability, willingness and desire of the student to pursue and
complete the course of study.
(5) Any willful estrangement between parent and student caused by the
student after attaining majority.
(6) The ability of the student to contribute to the student's expenses
through gainful employment. The student's history of employment is
material under this paragraph.
(7) Any other relevant factors.
(f) When liability may not be found.-A court shall not order support for
educational costs if any of the following circumstances exist:
(1) Undue financial hardship would result to the parent.
(2) The educational costs would be a contribution for postcollege gradu-
ate educational costs.
(3) The order would extend support for the student beyond the
student's twenty-third birthday. If exceptional circumstances exist, the
court may order educational support for the student beyond the
student's twenty-third birthday.
(g) Parent's obligation.-A parent's obligation to contribute toward the educa-
tional costs of a student shall not include payments to the other parent for
the student's living expenses at home unless the student resides at home
with the other parent and commutes to school.
(h) Termination or modification of orders.-Any party may request modifi-
cation or termination of an order entered under this section upon proof of
change in educational status of the student, a material change in the finan-
cial status of any party or other relevant factors.
(i) Applicability.-
(1) This act shall apply to all divorce decrees, support agreements,
support orders, agreed or stipulated court orders, property settlement
agreements, equitable distribution agreements, custody agreements
and/or court orders and agreed to or stipulated court orders in effect
on, executed or entered since, November 12, 1992.
(2) In addition, this act shall apply to all pending actions for support.
This section shall not supersede or modify the express terms of a
voluntary written marital settlement agreement or any court order
entered pursuant thereto.
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purported to place the adult children of divorced parents on
equal footing with those of married parents. Proponents of Act
62 espoused the argument that children of divorced parents are
often left in a disadvantaged state. Opponents, on the other
hand, focused on the disparity in treatment of the obli-
gors/parents, the parents who, despite their wishes, are forced
to support adult children in college. Opponents of Act 62 also
focused on the disparity in treatment of the adult children of
intact families; children who, unlike their counterparts, lack a
forum in which to fulfill their educational dreams.
In Curtis v. Kline,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
called on to review the legislation that it had ostensibly solicit-
ed in Blue.' Commanding a sudden halt to the escalating dis-
pute, the court declared Act 62 unconstitutional on equal pro-
tection grounds.'
This article on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Curtis begins with an account of the unfolding college support
law in the Commonwealth and the foreshadowing of Act 62.
The article reviews the supreme court's decision and offers
alternative views on the constitutionality of Act 62. The article
concludes that, despite the court's restrained analysis, Curtis
represents a victory for equal protection law.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA'S COLLEGE SUPPORT LAW
At common law, the duty to support children and provide
them with the necessities of life was commensurate with the
parents' right to their children's services.' Today, however, the
duty of support to a minor child is absolute and does not de-
pend on the access of the parent to the child.7
(j) Definitions.-As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall
have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
"Educational costs." Tuition, fees, books, room, board and other educa-
tional materials.
"Postsecondary education." An educational or vocational program provid-
ed at a college, university or other postsecondary vocational, secretarial,
business or technical school.
Id.
3. 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995).
4. See supra note 1.
5. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 270.
6. Maureen Kelley O'Connor, Note, Support Obligations of the Non-Custodial
Parent for Private Secondary and College Education: Toward a Uniform and
Equitable Resolution, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 755, 756 n.5 (1982); see also Robert
M. Washburn, Post Majority Support: Oh, Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMPLE L.Q. 319, 325
(1971).
7. See, e.g., Melzer v. Witsberger, 480 A-2d 991, 996 (Pa. 1984).
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Generally, courts award support and maintenance only to
minor children8 because a parent's legal obligation to support a
child usually terminates upon the child's reaching the statutory
age of majority.9 Prior to 1971, the statutory age of majority in
most states was twenty-one."0 Because most children complete
college prior to or shortly after reaching the age of twenty-one,
there was little cause for debate.
The adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in 1971 reduced the voting age from twen-
ty-one to eighteen." Shortly thereafter, many states staged
efforts to terminate child support at age eighteen. 2 Out of this
battle emerged the current controversy over postsecondary
educational support. The lowering of the age of majority to
eighteen intensified the college support debate because, as
noted above, while a twenty-one year old is ordinarily nearing
graduation from college, an eighteen year old is usually just
beginning postsecondary education. 3
States reacted to the college support controversy in various
ways. Some states created or continued a right to college sup-
port through judicial decree, some passed statutes providing for
college support, some passed statutes requiring support until a
child completes high school, and still others enacted statutes
terminating support at age eighteen, nineteen, or twenty, re-
gardless of educational status. 4
8. 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 49 (1978). See infra note 14 for a survey of
state law treatment of parental support.
9. 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 62a (1978).
10. Kathleen Conrey Horan, Postminority Support for College Education-A
Legally Enforceable Obligation in Divorce Proceedings?, 20 FAM. L.Q. 589, 590
(1987).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age." Id.
12. Horan, supra note 10, at 590-91.
13. Id. at 591.
14. As of August of 1995, seventeen states and the District of Columbia
provide for college support in some manner and form. The states are: Alabama,
Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and
Washington. See Stanford v. Stanford, 628 So. 2d 701, 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10-115(1.5)(a)(III), 14-10-115(1.5)(b)(I) (West Supp.
1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-401 (1981); Butler v. Butler, 496 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C.
1985); HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (West Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 750, para.
5/513 (West Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-12 (West Supp. 1994); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.1(6) (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-
202(a)(2Xiii)(1) (Michie 1991); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 28 (Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 93-5-23, 93-11-65 (Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340(5) (West Supp.
1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 240(1-
b)(c)(7) (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108 (1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
474 Vol. 34:471
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Pennsylvania's General Assembly countered the Twenty-sixth
Amendment by reducing the maximum age at which a criminal
penalty could be imposed for non-support of a disabled child
from twenty-one to eighteen, but the penalty for non-support of
an able child still could be imposed only until the child reached
the age of sixteen. 5 In many substantive areas, the General
Assembly reduced the age of majority from twenty-one to eigh-
teen, 6 excepting support of indigent and handicapped chil-
§ 4327; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-160, 20-7-40 (1989); Bull v. Smith, 382 S.E.2d 905
(S.C. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090
(West Supp. 1995).
Nine states terminate child support at age eighteen or nineteen, or after
graduation from high school or its equivalent, whichever occurs later. The nine
states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas,
and Vermont. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.24.160, 25.27.061 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-2451(A), 25-320(C) (West Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-
312(a)(5)(A) (Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE § 32-706(B) (Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1610(a) (Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:35-C (Supp. 1994); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.031 (Supp. 1994); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 658(c) (1989).
Twenty-four states terminate all child support once the child graduates from
high school or its equivalent, or when the child reaches age eighteen, nineteen or
twenty, whichever occurs first. The states are: California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3901(a) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-84(b) (West
Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501(d) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07(2)
(West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15(e) (Michie Supp. 1994); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.213(3) (1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.22(c) (West Supp. 1995); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 303(2)(A) (West Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 552.16a, 552.451c (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.54(2) (West 1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(5) (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-364, 43-504
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425.300(a) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-6-1, 40-4-
7(a) (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-
08.2(1) (Michie 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112(D) (West. Supp. 1995); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2(b) (Michie 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 25-5-18.1, 25-
7-6.1 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-11-102(a), (b) (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-107.2 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-15b(2) (1995); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.25(4) (West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 14-1-101 (1993).
15. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4321-4366 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
16. See generally 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1901 (1972), repealed and replaced by
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5101(b) (1990 & Supp. 1995) (recognizing individuals eighteen
years old and older as adults who may sue and be sued); 16 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2175(4), (6) (Supp. 1992) (providing for emancipation of minors and the ability to
establish settlement in counties); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2811 (Supp. 1992) (reducing
the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen); 42 PA_ CONS. STAT. § 6302 (1990) (de-
fining a "child" as a person under the age of eighteen for purposes of juvenile
adjudicatory proceedings); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4502 (Supp. 1995) (relieving parents
of incompetent children in state institutions of a legal duty of support when the
child reaches the age of eighteen); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2021 (1972), repealed and
replaced by 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5101(a) (1990) (giving to persons eighteen years
of age and older the right to contract).
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dren"7 and the consumption of alcohol."
In 1972, the legislature amended the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure to change the age of "majority" from twenty-one
to eighteen. 9 At approximately the same time, however, the
legislature amended the rules of statutory construction to
define "majority" as twenty-one years or older.20 This definition
of majority applies to all statutes enacted on or after September
1, 1937, unless the applicable statute provides otherwise."'
Conversely, the Statutory Construction Act does not define a
"child" or "children" in terms of age.22 This ambiguity was
compounded by the then-existing civil support statute which
contained no reference to age and did not include the term
majority.23
The civil support statute was amended and now reads in
part: "Parents may be liable for the support of their children
who are 18 years of age or older."' While this statutory provi-
sion seemingly furnished the grounds upon which to base a
parental obligation of postsecondary educational support, Penn-
sylvania courts, prior to the enactment of Act 62, avoided refer-
ence to it when considering support petitions for postsecondary
educational costs.25 Instead, Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v.
Sommerville" controlled the issue of college support in Penn-
sylvania for close to thirty years, from 1963 until 1992.
In Sommerville, a father petitioned the court to vacate the
support order as to his eighteen-year-old daughter who was
attending college.27 The father contended that he was under no
17. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968 & Supp. 1995) (providing that
financially able parents shall assist indigent children as the court shall determine);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432.6 (Supp. 1995) (authorizing the Department of Public
Welfare to initiate support actions against relatives for indigent children under the
age of twenty-one receiving public assistance).
18. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6307-6310.7 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
19. See PA. R. CIV. P. 76.
20. See Statutory Construction Act of 1972 § 1991, 1972 Pa. Laws 1339, 1357
(codified at 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1991 (1975 & Supp. 1992)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The repealed civil support statute provided:
[11f any man shall separate himself from his wife or children without rea-
sonable cause, and,... shall neglect or refuse to provide suitable mainte-
nance for his said wife or children, action may be brought, at law or in
equity, against such husband for maintenance of said wife or children ....
1955-1956 Pa. Laws 878, repealed and replaced by 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4301-4366
(1990 & Supp. 1995).
24. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321(3).
25. Id.
26. 190 A.2d 182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
27. Sommerville, 190 A.2d at 182-83.
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duty to continue support for his college-age daughter because
the existing support agreement did not address the
postsecondary education of either of his two daughters. 8 The
trial court rejected this argument and denied the father's peti-
tion to vacate.29
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court's
ruling and vacated the support order as to the college-age
daughter." In so doing, the court initially remarked that a
court may vacate a support order hen there is no agreement to
support a child during his or her college years. 1 In the same
judicial breath, however, the court opined that a parent may be
required to pay college support absent an agreement to pay
such support if the particular circumstances of the case so dic-
tate. 2 The court relied on Commonwealth v. Gilmore," a
1929 Pennsylvania Superior Court case in which a father was
ordered to support his sixteen-year-old son who wanted to com-
plete his high school education.' Acknowledging the great
importance and necessity of education, the court in Gilmore
noted that:
The law, apart from statute has come to recognize that paternal duty
involves, in addition to provision for mere physical needs, such instruc-
tion and education as may be necessary to fit the child reasonably to
support itself and to be an element of strength, rather than one of weak-
ness, in the social fabric of the state."
The court in Sommerville articulated a two-pronged test to
determine the propriety of ordering or enforcing support for
postsecondary education. 6  Under the first prong of the
Sommerville test, courts were required to ascertain whether the
child was able or willing to successfully pursue a chosen course
of study. The second prong called for courts to evaluate the
financial impact of such an order upon the obligor-that is,
28. Id. at 183.
29. Id. at 182.
30. Id. at 185.
31. Id. at 183. For cases involving an agreement to provide support for
college education, see Commonwealth ex rel. Howell v. Howell, 181 A.2d 903 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Grossman v. Grossman, 146 A.2d 315 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Stomel v. Stomel, 119 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1956).
32. Sommerville, 190 A.2d at 183.
33. 97 Pa. Super. 303 (1929).
34. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super at 312-13.
35. Id. at 308.
36. Sommerville, 190 A.2d at 184.
37. Id. (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Grossman v. Grossman, 146 A.2d 315
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1958)).
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whether the parent had sufficient assets, earning capacity or




The Sommerville test stood for approximately twenty-five
years.' In 1989, however, this writer authored the opinion in
Milne v. Milne,' in which the superior court added a third tier
of analysis. Writing for the court en banc, this author held that
a son's willful estrangement from his mother relieved the moth-
er of a duty to contribute to her son's college expenses.41 This
writer noted the shortcomings of the rigid two-pronged
Sommerville test:
By refusing to perfunctorily apply the two-pronged test in this case, we
are announcing that we are not content to focus on the pragmatic
aspects of the case-the wiseness of the investment (Caleb's aptitude to
do college work) and the feasibility of making it (Karen Milne's[, the
mother's,] ability to pay)--to the exclusion of familial aspects so unde-
niably central to the policy concerns giving rise to our intervention in
this area. We refuse to champion the importance of postsecondary edu-
cation over that of adult responsibility.42
Consistent with this rationale, Milne made it clear that es-
trangement must be considered as an additional prong of the
test in deciding post-minority support cases.'
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Emerick v. Emerick, 284 A.2d 682 (Pa. 1971); Leonard v.
Leonard, 510 A.2d 827, 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that the proper de-
termination in evaluating parents' ability to pay college expenses is the parents'
earning capacity rather than actual income); Miller v. Miller, 509 A.2d 402, 404
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that the independent resources of a college-age child
may be considered in determining the child's need for support); Lederer v. Lederer,
435 A-2d 199, 201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (holding that factors to be considered in
awarding support for college education include whether the child is able and willing
to successfully pursue a course of studies, the adequacy of the income of the child,
and whether the parent has sufficient estate, earning capacity or income to provide
for the education without undue hardship); Brake v. Brake, 413 A.2d 422, 423 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that a parent who never agreed to support a child past
the age of eighteen may be ordered to pay support for the child's college education,
as long as the support order would not impose undue hardship upon the parent).
40. 556 A.2d 854 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (Cirillo, P.J.), appeal denied, 568 A.2d 1248
(Pa. 1989).
41. Milne, 556 A.2d at 861. The facts of Milne are worthy of comment. Caleb
Milne had lived with his mother following the separation of his parents in 1984.
Id. at 853. Caleb was a senior in high school at the time of the separation. Id. By
March of 1985, Caleb became estranged from his mother and moved into his
father's residence. Id. Prior to moving out of his mother's home, however, Caleb
struck his mother, spat in her face, and shoved her to the ground on a least two
occasions. Id. at 855-56. In light of these facts, the superior court vacated the trial
court's entry of an order of support against Caleb's mother. Id. at 866-67.
42. Id. at 859.
43. Id. at 865. The three-part test enunciated in Milne is hereinafter referred
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For approximately three years, the trial courts and the supe-
rior court applied the Sommerville-Milne analysis to college
support cases." In 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
Blue v. Blue,' expressly rejected the Sommerville-Milne test."
Writing for the majority, Justice Zappala opined that the under-
lying premise upon which Pennsylvania courts applied the test
never existed in either statutory law or in common law.47
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Blue disapproved of
Sommerville's reliance on Gilmore.' The court in Gilmore had
recognized the importance of education and held that support for
education may be awarded when education is necessary for
children to support themselves." For approximately sixty
years, however, the superior court applied the Gilmore analysis
to college support cases." The court in Blue stated that the
term "education" as it was defined in 1929 did not contemplate
collegiate or professional education, "but rather was confined to
elementary and vocational education."5 The Blue court, there-
fore, rejected Gilmore's application to cases involving "enhanced"
education.52
to as the Sommerville-Milne test.
44. See, e.g., Cook v. Covey, 609 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Marino by
Marino v. Marino, 601 A.2d 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); O'Connell v. O'Connell, 597
A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Spitzer v. Tucker, 591 A.2d 723 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), appeal denied, 607 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1992); Fager v. Fatta, 576 A.2d 1089 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990); Pharoah v. Lapes, 571 A.2d 1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Powell v.
Conway, 562 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), rev'd, 625 A.2d 641 (Pa. 1993); Griffin
v. Griffin, 558 A.2d 75 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 571 A.2d 383 (Pa. 1989).
45. 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992).
45. Blue, 616 A.2d at 632.
47. Id. at 631. In Blue, Reginald Blue filed an action against his father for
the payment of Reginald's college expenses. Id. The trial court ordered the father to
pay $4,600.00 per year towards Reginald's college education, later to be reduced by
any educational loans and/or grants that Reginald received. Id. at 630. On appeal,
the superior court affirmed the $4,600.00 support amount, but reversed the trial
court's order insofar as it made Reginald's receipt of the support contingent upon
him making application for financial aid. Id.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the superior court's judgment,
finding that "[n]either statute nor specific case law had enunciated the legal maxim
relied upon by the lower courts." Id. at 631. The court acknowledged that it had
previously ordered a parent to pay college support. Id. (citing Emerick v. Emerick,
284 A.2d 682 (Pa. 1971)). However, in Blue, the court limited the application of
Emerick to situations where the parents had entered into an agreement to pay for
postsecondary educational costs, and the agreement was subsequently incorporated
into the divorce decree. Id. at 631.
48. Id. at 632.
49. Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. 303, 311 (1929).
50. Blue, 616 A.2d at 632.
51. Id.
52. Id. But see Bolton v. Bolton, 657 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(holding that Act 62 directs courts to order parents to contribute to their adult
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The Blue court opined that a parent's common law duty to
support a child terminates when the child reaches the age of
eighteen. 3 The court refused to expand this common law duty
of support by judicial pronouncement and, instead, declared that
it would await legislative input on the matter.5' The supreme
court's wait was short-lived; seven and one-half months later,
the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted Act 62."'
II. CURTIS V. KLINE55
A. The Facts
Philip H. Kline, the appellee in Curtis, is the father of three
children, Jason, Amber and Rebecca.57 Kline was paying sup-
port for his three children pursuant to a court order dated July
12, 1991. 5 In March of 1993, Kline filed a petition to terminate
his support obligation to Jason and Amber.59 At that time, Am-
ber was a student at Kutztown University and Jason was a
student at West Chester University."
On January 11, 1994, the trial court granted Kline's petition
to terminate child support for Amber and Jason."' The trial
court found that the order violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. 2 Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Wel-
children's undergraduate educations).
53. Blue, 616 A.2d at 632.
54. Id. Recognizing that many persons reach their eighteenth birthday prior
to graduation from high school, the court concluded that a parental duty of support
is owed until a child reaches eighteen or graduates from high school, whichever
occurs later. Id. at 632-33.
55. See supra note 2 for the text of Act 62.
56. 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995).
57. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267.
58. Id.
59. Id. Kline also asserted a constitutional challenge to Act 62, however, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General declined to participate in the litigation. Id. See PA.
R. CirV. P. 235 (granting the Pennsylvania Attorney General the discretionary right
to intervene as a party or to be heard without intervention in a proceeding alleging
the unconstitutionality of an Act of the Pennsylvania General Assembly).
60. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Curtis, the court indicated
that, had Kline raised his claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the court
would have applied the same equal protection analysis and reached the same
result. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267 n.1. See infra note 66 for a discussion of equal pro-
tection analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
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fare ("DPW") was granted permission to intervene. 3 DPW then
filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania."
B. The Issue
On direct appeal,65 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
asked to determine whether Act 62 violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.6 The court opined
that equal protection of the law is a pledge, and its requirement
is discharged if the laws operate on all alike.67 The court fur-
ther stated that the principle of equal protection requires that
uniform treatment be given to similarly situated individuals."
C. The Analytical Framework
In determining whether a particular piece of legislation
passes inquiry with respect to equal protection, it is necessary to
identify the group and the right or interest affected. 9 The con-
ventions of equal protection do not absolutely proscribe states
from classification and administering differing treatment.70
63. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267.
64. Id. While Curtis was pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court decided the case of Byrnes v. Caldwell, 654 A.2d 1125
(Pa. Super. Ct.) (en banc), rev'd, 665 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 1995). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania granted allocatur. See Byrnes v. Caldwell, 658 A-2d 791 (Pa. 1995)
(granting allocatur). As a result of the decision in Curtis, Byrnes was reversed. See
Byrnes, 665 A.2d at 1161.
In Byrnes, a majority of the superior court held that Act 62 passed the
rational basis test of the equal protection analysis. Byrnes, 654 A.2d at 1132. This
author dissented in Byrnes, and suggested that Act 62 does not meet the lowest
level of scrutiny, reasoning that Act 62 unconstitutionally burdens divorced parents,
imposing upon that class of parents an obligation to provide financially for an adult
child's college education. Id. at 1136 (Cirillo, J., dissenting).
65. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 742 (1990) ("The Superior Court shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the courts of
common pleas . . ").
66. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267. The courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia, in interpreting the Pennsylvania Constitution, are guided by the standards and
analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v.
Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1362 (Pa. 1986). The Pennsylvania
Constitution does not contain an "equal protection" clause per se-rather, it
contains several provisions within the Declaration of Rights and within the body of
the document which have been utilized to employ state equal protection analysis.
See PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 26; PA. CONST. art. II, § 32.
67. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 268.
68. Id. at 267. See Commonwealth v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 1986). See also
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REV. 341, 344 (1949).
69. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267-68.
70. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
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There remains a caveat, however, that:
If classifications are drawn, then the challenged policy must be reason-
ably justified. What counts as justification will depend upon which of
three types a classification belongs to, what governmental interest is in
promulgating the classification, and the relationship between that
interest and the classification itself.
7
Equal protection examinations are guided by the following
analysis:
The types of classifications are: (1) classifications which implicate a
"suspect" class or a fundamental right; (2) classifications implicating an
"important" though not fundamental right or a "sensitive" classification;
and (3) classifications which involve none of these. Should the statutory
classification in question fall into the first category, the statute is strict-
ly construed in light of a "compelling" governmental purpose; if the
classification falls into the second category, a heightened standard of
scrutiny is applied to an "important" governmental purpose; and if the
statutory scheme falls into the third category, the statute is upheld if
there is any rational basis for the classification.2
D. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Decision
The Curtis court declared Act 62 unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.7 3 Utilizing the rational basis test, the low-
est level of scrutiny, the court reasoned that the members of the
legislative designation, similarly situated young adults desiring
a college education and in need of financial assistance, were, as
a result of Act 62, treated unequally.74 The court reasoned that
MICH. L. REV. 213, 228 (1991) (reiterating the oft-cited principle that the Equal
Protection Clause does not require universal equal treatment, and suggesting that
no practical theory of equal protection could do so).
71. Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 310-11 (Pa. 1986) (citations
omitted), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987).
72. Smith, 516 A.2d at 311 (citations omitted).
73. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 270. Justice Zappala authored the majority opinion,
and was joined by Chief Justice Nix and Justices Flaherty and Castille. Id. at 267.
Justice Montemuro, sitting by designation, authored the dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Cappy joined. Id. at 270 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
74. Id. The superior court in Byrnes v. Caldwell, 654 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super.
Ct.) (en banc), rev'd, 665 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 1995), utilized the rational basis test and
concluded that "Act 62 tbears some rational relationship with a legitimate state
end,' and therefore does not violate the state and federal guarantees of equal
protection." Byrnes, 654 A.2d at 1132 (quoting Martin v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Bd., 466 A.2d 107, 1ll (Pa. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952 (1984)). Other
jurisdictions have utilized this level of scrutiny when presented with this issue.
Generally, the equal protection argument fails when the lowest level of scrutiny is
used. See, e.g., Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1391 (Ill. 1978) (uphold-
ing, against an equal protection challenge, the constitutionality of the Illinois
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there was no rational basis for the legislatively created classifi-
cation, stating that it could "conceive of no rational reason" why
the members of the class should be treated differently. 5
The court dismissed the higher levels of scrutiny, stating that
Act 62 "neither implicates a suspect class nor infringes upon a
fundamental right.7 6 The court also concluded that the classifi-
cation did not implicate an important right.77 To support this
conclusion, the court indicated that the classification does not
create a "suspect class," and that in the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania there exists no entitlement to postsecondary educa-
tion.78
In applying the rational basis test, the court set forth its
inquiry as follows: first, to determine whether Act 62 sought to
promote any legitimate state interest or public value, and,
second, if that question is answered in the affirmative, to deter-
mine whether "the classification adopted in the legislation is
reasonably related to accomplishing that articulated state inter-
est or interests."79
The court identified the "legitimate governmental purpose" as
"obviating difficulties encountered by those in non-intact fami-
lies who want parental financial assistance for postsecondary
education."" The court, however, "perceive[d] no rational basis
for the state government to provide only certain adult citizens
with legal means to overcome the difficulties they encounter in
pursuing that end."" The court recognized potential anomalous
circumstances demonstrating the arbitrariness of the statute's
classification.82 Of note is the example of a parent of two
children, one from a first marriage, and one from a second intact
marriage.' The first child would have a legal forum in which to
compel college support; the second child, by virtue of an intact
marriage, would have no such forum."
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which requires divorced parents to pay
for a child's post-majority education while not imposing this burden on non-divorced
parents). Accord Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986, 995 (Ala. 1989); Neudecker v.
Neudecker, 566 N.E.2d 557, 563-64 (Ind. Ct. App.), af/d, 577 N.E.2d 960 (Ind.
1991); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 209 (Wash. 1978). See also Horan, supra
note 10, at 8.
75. Curtis, 66B A.2d at 270.
76. Id. at 268.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 269.
80. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 269.
81. Id. at 269-70.




The court then examined the analysis of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in LeClair v. LeClair.85 In LeClair, the court
identified the classification in terms of parents-married parents
and divorced parents." Rejecting the constitutional challenge to
the postsecondary educational support statute, the New Hamp-
shire court determined that the statutory scheme ensured that
children of divorced families would not be deprived of education-
al opportunities solely because their families were no longer
intact, and the New Hampshire legislature could rationally
conclude that absent judicial involvement, children of divorced
parents may be less likely to receive postsecondary educational
support.87
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this analysis."
The court emphasized that in enacting Act 62, the legislature
focused on children, not parents.89 The legislative classification,
therefore, was the adult children desiring a postsecondary edu-
cation and requiring financial assistance." Confining its view
to this classification, the court concluded that it could conceive of
"no rational reason why those similarly situated with respect to
needing funds for college education[] should be treated unequal-
ly." 9
1
E. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent emphasized that the majority had ignored the
"distinction between the children of broken families and those of
intact families." 2 The dissent also reviewed LeClair, and noted
that the intent of the Pennsylvania legislature in enacting Act
62 was precisely the same as that of the New Hampshire state
legislature-an attempt to ameliorate the "disadvantage
wrought on children by divorce of their parents, and the necessi-
ty of court intervention to protect them from the consequences of
this disadvantage." Rejecting the majority's argument that the
legislature, in enacting Act 62, had focused on the children and
not the parents, the dissent observed that "any child support
legislation necessarily involves the marital status of the par-
85. 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993).





91. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 270.
92. Id. at 271 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 272 n.3 (citing LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1355).
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ents."94
Riveted to the "consequences of divorce" and the "emotional ill
which trails" in its wake, the dissent opined that "to deprive
children of broken marriages of the economic support which they
would normally receive from nuclear families is to deny them
equal protection."95 The dissent concluded that the majority had
overlooked protection of these children as the General
Assembly's "rational basis" for enacting Act 62,96 and cautioned
that, "[i]f the Majority's view prevails, there is no recourse for
these children, who will be victimized twice, first by the disrup-
tion, both financial and psychological, of their parents' divorce,
and again by the system which is theoretically designed to
protect them.""
F. Analysis
In its decision holding Act 62 unconstitutional on equal pro-
tection grounds, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discounted
the discriminatory classification of parents implicated by Act 62.
It is suggested that Act 62 creates a classification of par-
ents-divorced parents of adult children who desire a postseco-
ndary education, and non-divorced parents of adult children who
desire a postsecondary education. The statutory classification
has a differential impact on divorced parents as compared to
married parents. Furthermore, as explained in Part III, infringe-
ment upon divorced parents' right to make decisions concerning
their children's postsecondary education implicates the funda-
mental right of privacy.98
The Curtis court summarily concluded that the legislature's
focus in enacting Act 62 was on children.99 Maintaining this
focus, the court stated that neither the state constitution nor the
Federal Constitution "provides an individual right of
postsecondary education.""° The court, therefore, neglected
both the discriminatory classification of parents affected and the
fundamental privacy rights implicated by Act 62.
94. id.
95. Id.
96. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 273.
97. Id. at 274.
98. See Barbara L. Shapiro, "Non-Traditional" Families in the Courts: The
New Extended Family, 11 J. AM. AcAD. MATRiM. L. 117, 129 (1993) (citing
Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (holding that the state cannot
constitutionally interfere with a family merely because it thinks it can do a better
job of parenting)).
99. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 270.
100. Id. at 268.
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Act 62 imposes upon divorced parents an obligation to pay for
their adult child's college education, where no corresponding
obligation exists for married parents. The effect, therefore, is to
strip divorced or separated parents of their choices when the
question of college financing arises.'' Act 62's classification
implicates the fundamental right of privacy in the family do-
main, and operates to restrict personal choice in matters of fam-
ily life.'1 2 As such, a searching judicial analysis, strict scrutiny,
and the least deferential level of review, is applicable to this
inquiry.
Application of the strict scrutiny test is fatal to Act 62. The
state possesses no compelling interest, absent a minor child's in-
terests, which justifies a classification having a differential
impact and intrusion into the private family domain.0 3 The
courts of Pennsylvania have held that when a fundamental right
of privacy exists, the federal and state constitutions preclude
governmental limitation of this right unless justified by a com-
pelling state interest.'"I What counts as justification depends
on the classification, what the governmental interest is in pro-
mulgating the classification, and the relationship of that interest
to the classification itself."
To clarify, the essential questions are: what legitimate state
interest does the classification promote, and what fundamental
personal rights might the classification endanger? 6 Achieve-
ment of an "enhanced" education in today's society should not be
101. See Jeff Atkinson, Support For a Child's Post-Majority Education, 22 LOY.
U. CHI. L. J. 695, 711 (1991) (presenting the argument that a parent's right to
raise a child and direct a child's affairs is the right to exert influence over the
child's educational choices, including a determination of the level of financial
support to be provided by the parent for a child's education).
102. See also Jackson v. Garland, 622 A.2d 969, 971 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)); Weber v. Weber, 524 A.2d 498,
498-99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), appeal dismissed, 538 A.2d 494 (Pa. 1988)). See
generally Susan J. Germanio, Note, When College Begins and Child Support Ends:
An Analysis of the Pennsylvania Legislature's Response to Blue v. Blue, 3 WIDENER
J. PUB. L. 1109 (1994); Atkinson, supra note 101, at 711 (citing Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972)).
103. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
104. See McCusker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 639 A.2d 776 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994). See also Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 373 A.2d 751 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1977), affd, 414 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1980). See generally C. Edwin Baker, Outcome
Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U.
PA. L. REV. 933 (1983).
105. James v. SEPTA, 477 A.2d 1302, 1306 (Pa. 1984).
106. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
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minimized; without a doubt, the state possesses a legitimate
interest in preparing the young adults of this Commonwealth to
brave the challenges of an advanced society. That interest,
however, cannot be characterized as "compelling" so as to justify
legislative classifications and governmental intrusion into pri-
vate parental decisions." 7 Though appropriately reluctant to
do so, the state interferes to protect the interests of minor chil-
dren; equity demands legislative or judicial interference. State
interference is not appropriate, however, with respect to the re-
lationships between parents and adult children.08
107. Constitutional concerns aside, it is this author's contention that Act 62
offends the natural law from which the duty to support offspring is derived. See
generally Horan, supra note 10, at 602 (indicating that the underlying sentiment in
decisions refusing to impose a duty of postminority support is that a system of
voluntary support to adult children is more likely to foster a close relationship
between parents and children); Donna Schuele, Origins and Development of the Law
of Parental Child Support, 27 J. FAM. L. 807, 808-26 (1988-1989) (tracing the
development of American law on the subject); Leslie J. Harris et al., Making and
Breaking Connections Between Parents' Duty to Support and Right to Control Their
Children, 69 OR. L. REV. 689, 692-96 (1990) (summarizing the development of child
support law and analyzing how the law of child support is shaped by the reciproci-
ty between support duties, control rights, and the principle of parental autonomy);
Dana F. Castle, Early Emancipation Statutes: Should They Protect Parents As Well
As Children?, 20 FAM. L. Q. 343, 347 (1986) (defining family relationship in terms
of rights and obligations). Cf Milne v. Milne, 556 A.2d 854 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (Cirillo,
P.J.), appeal denied, 568 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1989).
As this writer expressed in the majority en banc opinion in Milne:
By college age, children of divorced parents must be expected to begin to
come to terms with the reality of their family's situation. They must begin to
realize that their attitudes and actions are their individual responsibilities.
Whatever their biases and resentments, while one can understand how they
got that way, when they become adults it is no longer appropriate to allow
them to stay that way without consequence. One of a parent's main duties in
raising a child is to teach him that he must take responsibility for his ac-
tions. The time-honored way in which this is accomplished is to make certain
that the child deals with the natural consequences that follow from whatever
course of action was chosen. Consider the lesson we are teaching if we allow
adult children to use the powers of the state to force a parent whom they
have abused and rejected to contribute to their college education. This kind of
message can hardly be considered one which is beneficial for the welfare of
those children.
Milne, 556 A.2d at 861.
Taking this view one step further, this author raises the question of
whether the courts or the legislature should delve at all into the financing and
decision-making regarding postsecondary education for adult children. Regulating
filial relationships between adults when it comes to matters such as custody or
support of minor children can be rationalized purely on the basis of the child's
minority and the doctrine of parens patriae. This is not applicable, however, in
matters between parents and adult children.
108. Various authorities, including the eminent Justice Blackstone, have opined
that the duty to support a child is a moral one. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 441-42 (1765). See also Blue v. Blue, 616
A.2d 628, 633 (Pa. 1992) (determining that the duty of support extends to a basic
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As the dissent in Curtis astutely observed, Act 62 "necessarily
involves" the parents.'O' The dissent acknowledged that a stat-
ute "requiring parents of an intact marriage to finance their
children's college education would indeed infringe upon the
constitutional/privacy right of the parties[,]" but stopped short of
delving into the privacy issue with respect to divorced or sepa-
rated parents."' The dissent justified state interference on two
findings: "the widespread need for enforcement of court ordered
support" and the need for "educational achievements of the next
generations" as "critical to the success of this country in an
increasingly competitive world.""'
III. ALTERNATIVE AVENUES FOR REACHING THE SUPREME
CouRT's HOLDING
In deeming Act 62 unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court predicated its holding on equal protection grounds,
concluding that similarly positioned young adults, those in need
of financial assistance for postsecondary education, should not
be treated unequally."' While Curtis exemplifies a triumph in
the realm of equal protection, the decision, in this author's
opinion, potentially could have rested upon other constitutional
bases, namely, the right to privacy and separation of powers.
A. The Right to Privacy
Closely related to the equal protection concerns brought about
by Act 62 is the troublesome notion that had the Act been per-
mitted to stand, it undoubtedly would have served to infringe
upon the privacy rights of the divorced family, specifically, the
freedom of the family to make important decisions. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of privacy based on article 1, section 1
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides: "All men are
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protect-
ing property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happi-
ness. "113
education, defined as a high school education, or until a minor reaches the age of
eighteen, whichever occurs later).
109. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 272 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 273.
111. Id. at 274.
112. Id. at 270.
113. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1. See Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, State Ethics
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At the suggestion of the United States Supreme Court in
Whalen v. Roe,"4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a
two-pronged analysis of privacy encompassing: (1) a freedom
from disclosure of personal matters and, more relevant for
purposes of this article, (2) the freedom to make certain impor-
tant decisions."' In Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, State Ethics
Commission,"' Justice Flaherty synopsized Justice Brandeis'
description of our constitutional right to privacy and its corre-
lation to our individual freedom:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 7
The United States Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the
right to privacy comes not from the United States Constitution,
in which there exists no specific right to privacy guarantee, but,
rather, has grown out of the Court's recognition of zones of
privacy created by the more specific constitutional guarantees;
the sources of this right may be found in the penumbra of vari-
ous specific constitutional provisions."' The landmark case of
Comm'n, 470 A.2d 945, 948 (Pa. 1983) (plurality opinion) (recognizing article I,
section 1 as the basis for the guaranteed right to privacy); In Re June 1979
Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A-2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980) (stating
that privacy interest finds explicit protection in article 1, section 1). See also
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992); Fabio v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 414 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1980); In Re "B", 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978).
114. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
115. See Denoncourt, 470 A.2d at 948; In Re June 1979 Allegheny County
Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d at 77; see also McCusker v. Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeal Bd., 639 A.2d 776, 778 (Pa. 1994); Stenger, 609 A.2d at 800;
Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d 354, 361 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), affd, 652
A.2d 294 (Pa. 1994); Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Welfare, 482 A.2d
1148, 1159 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), affd, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985).
116. 470 A.2d 945 (Pa. 1983).
117. Denoncourt, 470 A.2d at 948-49 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)); accord Common-
wealth v. Murray, 223 A.2d 102, 109-10 (Pa. 1966) (plurality opinion) (Musmanno,
J.); Schaeffer, 536 A.2d at 361-62.
118. Such specific constitutional provisions include the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech, press and association. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23-24, reh'g denied, 404 U.S.
876 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Such provisions also include the Third Amendment's prohibi-
tion against the peacetime quartering of soldiers in any house without the consent
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Griswold v. Connecticut... provided the first express constitu-
tional recognition to the right to privacy. In striking down a
Connecticut criminal statute that prohibited the use of contra-
ceptives, the Court established constitutional protection for the
privacy of the marital unit.2 Although Griswold was the first
case to expressly articulate the right of family privacy, at least
one scholar has recognized 2 ' that the Supreme Court has since
identified the inception of the family privacy doctrine in two
earlier decisions, Meyer v. Nebraska.2 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters." The Court first identified this heritage of family pri-
vacy in 1944 in Prince v. Massachusetts," wherein the Court
of the owner. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (Harlan,
J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961). In addition, the Supreme Court
has found zones of privacy in the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-
85. The Court has also found zones of privacy in the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 440-43, reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). Finally, such
provisions also include the Ninth Amendment's reservation to the people of rights
not expressly enumerated in the Constitution. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484;
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961)). See In Re "B", 394
A.2d 419, 424 (Pa. 1979).
119. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. Finding the right of privacy to be grounded
fnmly in the Bill of Rights, Justice Douglas stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the bill of rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmo-
ny in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions.
Id.
121. See generally Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family,
67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 968-70 (1993) (suggesting, among other things, that consti-
tutional protection for the family has continued to be a primary focus in privacy
cases, developing along with the right of individual autonomy).
122. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court struck down a state law pro-
hibiting the teaching of subjects in any language other than English. Meyer, 262
U.S. at 403. In so doing, the Court relied on the appellant instructor's right "to
teach and the right of the parents to engage him . . . to instruct their children."
Id. at 400. In addition to finding that parents have a right to enter into this
educational contract, the Court insinuated that this right to contract developed from
"the power of parents to control the education of their own." Id. at 401.
123. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Pierce Court, citing Meyer, invalidated a state
statute prohibiting parents from sending their children to private schools on the
basis that the law "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-
35 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390).
124. 321 U.S. 158, reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944)
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described Pierce and Meyer as decisions that "have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."
125
The Court has continued its constitutional protection for "the
sanctity of the family,"1 26 emphasizing that the family unit
provides much of the substance for the constitutional right to
privacy. 127
Against this backdrop of the constitutionally recognized right
to privacy and, specifically, the privacy rights traditionally
accorded to the family unit, "the freedom to make certain impor-
tant decisions," free from state intrusion, must be analyzed
within the context of a divorced family, with a focus on the
intrusion into the parent/child relationship where such "child"
has reached the age of majority."
The significance given to privacy by some commentators is the
familiar one of autonomy or freedom from governmental control.
One statement of this affiliation is:
In this country, intrafamily relations are a private rather than a govern-
mental concern. The state does establish a legal basis for the family's
existence, but this defining function is exercised principally when
families are either being founded, as in marriage or adoption, or dis-
solved, as in divorce or death. Even then, the state's role is minimal
unless property is involved. The government is only too happy to avoid
having either to forbid or to require particular interpersonal behav-
ior."
Naturally, it must be recognized that, upon divorce, the veil of
125. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
126. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a housing ordinance limiting the occu-
pancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single "family," which encompassed only
a few categories of related individuals).
127. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. See generally Bowers; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
431 U.S. 816 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce; Meyer.
It should be recognized that, in the majority of these cases, the Court noted
that the right to privacy related to family matters emanates from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Clause provides that "[n]o State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
128. Denoncourt, 470 A.2d at 948. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying
text.
129. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WiS. L. REV.
1135, 1144-45 (1985) (quoting JUDITH STIEHM, GOVERNMENT AND THE FAMILY: JUS-
TICE AND ACCEPTANCE, CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 361-62 (1979)).
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family privacy is lifted to some extent. "Some judicial involve-
ment is necessary to supervise the dissolution of the legal rela-
tionship and to reallocate the couple's property rights. Legal
oversight also serves to reinforce informal social norms, weak-
ened in the context of divorce, by directing parents to fulfill their
prescribed responsibilities despite the breakdown of the mar-
riage."3' State regulation of custody and support of minor
children, therefore, can be predicated on the basis of the child's
minority and the law of parens patriae. More difficult to justify,
however, is a law allowing for judicial intervention into that
sphere of family decisions unrelated to the basic needs of minor
children. This author proposes that within this realm of family
privacy lies the choice parents are qualified to make with regard
to their children's education, specifically, to what extent, if any,
a parent opts to financially contribute to their adult children's
college education. Clearly, a parent is obligated to provide the
basic essentials to a minor child such as food, shelter, and medi-
cal expenses. Inevitably the question arises as to whether a
college education is deemed a "necessity" for purposes of legally
enforcing parents to provide such an education."' According to
one group of scholars:
Most courts' reluctance to require parents to support their adult chil-
dren probably does not stem from skepticism about the worth of higher
education. Instead, it may stem from the concern about the effect on
family dynamics if parents are compelled to support their college stu-
dent children.... Support during college can be a powerful means to
this end. Requiring a parent to support an adult child in school may in
effect result in imposing a duty of support on a parent who has no legal
authority (because the child is over the age of majority) or practical
ability to control the child."
130. Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REV. 615, 669 (1992). See Jordan C. Paul, Comment, 'You get the House. I
get the Car. You get the Kids. I Get their Souls." The Impact of Spiritual Custody
Awards on the Free Exercise Rights of Custodial Parents, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 583
(1989).
Paul states:
Although constitutional protection extends to a "parent in . . . his or her
relationship with and authority over the child," this protection breaks down
when there is a divorce and a battle for the custody of children ensues ...
The state thus utilizes its power under the theory of "parens patriae to inter-
vene in family affairs where the physical or mental well-being of the child is
imminently and substantially threatened."
Id. at 597 (footnotes omitted).
131. See Harris et al., supra note 107, at 809-10; Terrance A. m0ine, Note,
Clifford Trusts and the Parental Duty to Provide a College Education: Braun v.
Commissioner, 46 U. PrTT. L. REV. 537, 547 (1985).
132. Harris et al., supra note 107, at 722 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Vol. 34:471
1996 Curtis v. Kline-An Equal Protection Law Triumph 493
A divorced or separated parent who is respected and honored
will usually volunteer to send an adult child through college; to
impose upon parents anything beyond a purely voluntary deci-
sion would make tyrants out of adult children who have little or
no regard for their mother or father. We, as a society, must fos-
ter the Judeo-Christian precept: "Honor thy father and thy
mother.""
Because the decision to support adult children through
postsecondary education falls outside the parameter of the
state's undeniable duty to see to it that children of divorced
parents are supported throughout the child's minority,"3 the
protection afforded to family privacy rights (between the parent
and adult child) is not weakened. In other words, in terms of the
right to privacy analysis, there is no reason to distinguish be-
tween divorced parents and non-divorced parents when consider-
ing the question of college support. "The suggestion that paren-
tal authority is diminished vis a vis the government as the
result of the dissolution of the parents' spousal relationship...
would seem inconsistent with constitutional recognition of pa-
rental authority where a spousal relationship between the par-
ents never existed."3 6
That having been said, it must be determined to what extent
the constitutional protection affording a parent's right to raise a
child and provide guidance for an adult child's postsecondary
educational choices is recognized. "Pennsylvania has not adopted
a flexible approach in its state constitutionality privacy analysis.
Under the law of this Commonwealth only a compelling state
interest will override one's privacy rights." " It is true that not
133. Exodus 20:12.
134. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
135. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (citing
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)). The Zumnmo court ruled, among other
things, that a parent may pursue whatever course of religious indoctrination which
that parent sees fit during periods of lawful custody and/or visitation. Zummo, 574
A.2d at 1140. In making its determination, the court specifically stated: "[W]e
cannot see how the marital status of the parents should affect the degree of harm
to the child required to justify governmental intervention." Id.
136. Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., 609 A.2d 796, 800 (Pa. 1992) (citing
Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 414 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1980)). See also McCusker v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 639 A.2d 776, 778 (Pa. 1994) (holding that
where a fundamental right to privacy exists, governmental regulation limiting such
a right may only be justified by a compelling state interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 154 (1973) (holding that governmental regulation limiting the right to privacy
may only be justified by a compelling state interest).
As discussed earlier in this article the right of privacy encompasses two
distinct privacy interests. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. One is
the autonomy interest, i.e., that relating to personal decision-making in important
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every governmental intrusion into family affairs is an infringe-
ment on the constitutional right to privacy requiring a court to
invoke strict scrutiny; however, when parental decision-mak-
ing/privacy matters are brought into question, these issues are
best served by invoking a strict scrutiny analysis.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Curtis could have legiti-
mately applied this analysis to Act 62. In implementing a strict
scrutiny analysis, a court must first determine whether the
parent's privacy interest in determining whether to financially
contribute to an adult child's education is a "fundamental right."
The net of constitutional protection for fundamental rights has
not yet been thrown so far as to encompass the parental decision
to provide college support for a child. To include such a right as
fundamental, however, would not constitute a great leap from
those family/parental autonomy decisions that have been deter-
mined to include fundamental rights.'37 In Roe v. Wade,"
the Court cited many cases demonstrating that personal rights
can be deemed fundamental and included in the right to priva-
cy. Such cases "make it clear that the right [to privacy] has
some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa-
tion.""4 It is undisputed that a college education carries with it
many benefits; this, however, does not necessarily warrant the
state's infringement upon the fundamental right to privacy that
a parent should enjoy if, for instance, "for moral reasons, he [or
she] wishes his [or her] child to earn his [or her] way through
school.""" It can be persuasively argued that the right to instill
values, such as a strong work ethic, in one's children should not
be vanquished by enactments that serve to intervene in such
personal decisions.'4 2 To reiterate, if an aspiring student pos-
sesses the drive and aptitude, he or she will find a way to ac-
matters. This interest may be overridden only when there is a compelling state
interest. See Stenger, 609, A.2d at 800; Fabio, 414 A.2d at 89; Roe, 410 U.S. at
134. The constitutionality of the second interest, confidentiality (or freedom from
disclosure of personal matters), is determined by a flexible balancing approach. See
Stenger, 609 A-2d at 801.
137. See generally supra note 127.
138. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
140. Id. See supra note 127, with emphasis on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (invalidating a law requiring formal education through age sixteen as
applied to Amish children and emphasizing the values of parental direction of a
child's religious upbringing and education).
141. Germano, supra note 102, at 1131.
142. See Marvin M. Moore, Parents' Support Obligations to Their Adult Chil-
dren, 19 AKRON L. Rav. 183, 195-96 (1985); see also Germanio, supra note 102, at
1131.
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quire a college education without requesting a pecuniary contri-
bution from a financially-pressed parent, and will thereby gain
an appreciation for self-discipline and assiduousness."
As stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "[clentral to
this aspect of the privacy right is the intrusion of government
into the sphere of marriage and family life by prohibiting or
criminalizing certain kinds of decisions."1" A law which may
serve to prohibit a parent's private decision to have a child earn
his or her way through school, to cite one example, forbids a
decision properly generated within the sphere of the family, even
a divorced family. Thus, while Act 62 violates equal protection
as pronounced in Curtis, it also, generally speaking, prohibits
parental determination of educational support.
As an alternative to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's hold-
ing, the case having been made that Act 62 implicates a "funda-
mental right" (i.e., it is a law which imposes upon divorced
parents' right to make decisions regarding the rearing and
education of their children), it should therefore be subject to the
strict scrutiny test-the least deferential level of review. As
Professor Gerald Gunther has noted, such a level of scrutiny is
frequently "strict" in theory and "fatal" in fact.' Only a com-
pelling state interest will override one's privacy rights.'" The
state's interest in ensuring that adult children of divorced par-
ents receive a college education, while important, cannot be
deemed compelling. The legislature's imposition upon divorced
parents' rights to make decisions regarding the education of
their children greatly diminishes family privacy and the freedom
of choice. If a college-educated society is eminently significant to
the state, perhaps the state should be the primary contributor of
funds for that purpose. 4" Thus, just as Act 62 does not pass
constitutional muster under an equal protection analysis, nei-
ther may it be deemed constitutional when analyzed within the
realm of the right to privacy.
B. Separation of Powers /Retroactivity of Laws
In addition to the Curtis court's conclusion that Act 62 violat-
es the precepts of equal protection, it is this author's opinion
143. Moore, supra note 142, at 195-96.
144. McCusker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 639 A.2d 776, 779
(Pa. 1994).
145. Gunther, supra note 102, at 8; Atkinson, supra note 101, at 699.
146. See supra note 136.
147. See Moore, supra note 142, at 188.
Duquesne Law Review
that the Act could not have withstood a constitutional challenge
pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine. As previously
discussed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Blue v. Blue"
held that parents owe no duty of support for an adult child's
postsecondary educational expenses. "" Blue was filed on No-
vember 13, 1992.150 The legislature responded to the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Blue by signing Act 62 into law on
July 2, 1993, and making it retroactive to November 12, 1992,
the day before Blue was decided.151 Act 62 took effect, there-
fore, one day prior to the filing of Blue. The effect of this ret-
roactive application nullified the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Blue, and violates the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers.
Bias against retroactive laws dates back to ancient Greek and
Roman times. 5' American law also adopted this principle, and
it was believed that the purpose of a law was that it be a rule
for the future.'53 American courts recognized this principle as a
rule of construction which would be followed in the interpreta-
tion of statutes."M In fact, the United States Supreme Court
has specifically decreed that retroactive legislation would not be
favored, that such laws were contrary to American jurispru-
dence, and that in the absence of an express command to the
contrary, laws will act prospectively.'55 Thus, it follows that a
statute commences on the day of its enactment.
156
148. 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992).
149. Blue, 616 A.2d at 633.
150. Id. at 628.
151. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4327.
152. See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic
Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 775-77 (1936) (discussing the
early opposition to the retroactive application of laws). Roman Law followed the
principle that laws and customs should be applied to future transactions and should
not be applied to past events unless it was expressly stated that such laws were to
be applied to past events or pending transactions. Id. at 776. This principle found
its way into English common law and was adopted by the English courts and
commentators. Id. at 777. Early English courts subscribed to "the rule of construc-
tion that no law should be given an operation from a time prior to its enactment
unless Parliament had expressly provided that it should have such an effect or
unless the words of the Act could have no meaning except by application to this
past time." Id. at 778 (footnotes omitted).
153. Smead, supra note 152, at 780.
154. Id.
155. United States v. American Sugar Refining Co., 202 U.S. 563, 577 (1906).
See also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1872).
156. Smead, supra note 152, at 781. The rule was ultimately incorporated into
the Constitution of the United States by the construction given to the Ex Post
Facto, Contract, and Due Process Clauses. Id. at 797. "By the doctrines of judicial
review and separation of powers American law provided the institutionalism neces-
sary to transpose this principle ... into an effective transcendental limitation on
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This deeply rooted concern in American jurisprudence regard-
ing retroactive legislation, and its application to the separation
of powers doctrine, was recently explored in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms."7 The
issue before the Supreme Court in Plaut was whether Section
27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to the extent that
it requires federal courts to reopen final judgments in private
civil actions under Section 10(b) of the Act, contravenes the
constitutional principal of separation of powers." The Court
found Section 27A(b) unconstitutional to the extent that it re-
quires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its
enactment.5 ' Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia traced the
connection between the separation of powers doctrine and the
principle of legislative retroactivity back to the Framers of the
United States Constitution.' Justice Scalia wrote that
Congress' enactment of section 27A(b) violates Article III of the
United States Constitution because it commands federal courts
to reopen final judgments.' Justice Scalia stated:
Article III establishes a "judicial department" with the "province and du-
ty... to say what the law is" in particular cases and controversies.
[Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49, 70 (1803).] The record of
history shows that the Framers crafted this charter of the judicial
department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them,
subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy-
with an understanding, in short, that "a judgment conclusively resolves
the case" because "a 'judicial power' is one to render dispositive judg-
ments."1"
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers made the
crucial decision to create a judicial branch that was separate
and independent of the legislative branch by providing that "the
judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
legislative power." Id. Utilization of the separation of powers doctrine to support
the limit on legislative power was the next natural step in American courts. Id. at
789 n.42.
157. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). See generally J. Richard Doige, Is Purely Retroac-
tive Legislation Limited by the Separation of Powers? Rethinking United States v.
Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910 (1994).
158. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1450.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1453.
161. Id. at 1457.
162. Id. at 1453 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990)).
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from time to time ordain and establish." 1"3 Several of the prin-
cipal Framers, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexan-
der Hamilton, acknowledged the dangers posed by legislative at-
tempts to usurp judicial prerogatives. t 4 Ratification of the
United States Constitution solidified these concerns, and the
judicial decisions which immediately followed the ratification
confirmed the understanding that interference with the final
judgments of courts was not to be tolerated. 5 This was reflect-
ed on both the federal and state levels.166
It is clear, therefore, that the final judgments of the courts,
both state and federal, are outside the reach of the legislative
branch. This principle existed prior to the formation of the
federal and state constitutions, but was purposefully and wisely
incorporated into those constitutions and it continues to sustain
the separation of governmental powers today, as evidenced by
the Supreme Court's decision in Plaut. In delivering the opinion
of the Court in Plaut, Justice Scalia applied the separation of
powers doctrine to Section 27A(b) and found that Section 27A(b)
"effects a clear violation of the separation-of-powers principle we
have just discussed."" 7 Justice Scalia wrote:
When retroactive legislation requires its own application in a case
already finally adjudicated, it does no more and no less than reverse a
determination once made, in a particular case. [The Federalist No. 81, at
545 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).] Our decisions stemming
163. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1453.
164. Id. Madison enunciated his concern regarding the necessity for the
separation of powers as he wrote: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). See also Doige, supra note 157, at 13. Alexander Hamilton simi-
larly expressed his belief that the judicial branch of government should be separate
and independent of legislative domination:
It is not true . . . that the Parliament of Great Britain, or the legislatures of
the particular states, can rectify the exceptionable decisions of their respective
courts, in any other sense than might be done by a future legislature of the
United States. The theory neither of the British, nor the state constitutions,
authorizes the revisal of a judicial sentence, by a legislative act. . . . A leg-
islature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once
made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future
cases.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
165. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1455.
166. Id. Justice Scalia focused upon one state court decision as representative
of the states' understanding of the separation of powers. See id. (citing Bates v.
Kimball, 2 D. Chip. 77 (Vt. 1824) (holding the power of the legislature to annul a
final judgment is an assumption of judicial power and therefore forbidden)).
167. Id. at 1456.
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from Hayburn's Case... have uniformly provided fair warning that
such an act exceeds the powers of Congress."
Justice Scalia recognized, however, that Congress may never-
theless revise the judgments of Article III courts. "When a new
law makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must
apply that law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were
rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the out-
come accordingly."6 ' Justice Scalia elaborated on the effect
that retroactive legislation has upon the hierarchy of "inferior
courts" and "one supreme court" by explaining that the decision
of an inferior court is not the final judgment in the case, unless
the time for appeal has expired. 70 Rather, "it is the obligation
of the last court in the hierarchy that rules on the case to give
effect to Congress' latest enactment, even when that has the
effect of overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since
each court, at every level, must 'decide according to existing
laws.'"'' Justice Scalia emphatically pointed out, however,
that, once a judgment is, in fact, final, then the legislative
branch may not alter that particular adjudication.'72 "Having
achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes the last
word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case
or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive
legislation that the law applicable to that very case was some-
thing other than what the courts said it was."'73 With regard
to Section 27A(b), Justice Scalia opined that this enactment vio-
lates the separation of powers doctrine because it deprives
judicial judgments of the conclusive effect that the judgments
had when they were announced.
1 74
Thus, the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Plaut is clear.
The separation of powers doctrine restricting the legislative
branch's interference with final judgments is, as it always has
been, a crucial element in this country's governmental structure
168. Id. (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 113 (1948)).
169. Id. at 1457 (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103 (1801) and Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1485, 1500-08 (1994)).
170. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1457.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1458.
174. id. Justice Scalia also noted that whether an enactment reopens (or
directs the reopening of) final judgments in one case or a whole class of cases is
irrelevant. Id. at 1457. He wrote: "The [separation of powers] prohibition is violated
when an individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the very best
of reasons,... and it is violated 40 times over when 40 final judgments are
legislatively dissolved." Id.
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utilizing checks and balances to avoid the tyranny which our
Founding Fathers so feared.
Since the inception of its governmental bodies, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania has adhered to this understanding set
forth by Justice Scalia in Plaut and strongly follows the princi-
ple that the doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental to
the prevention of concentrated authority and tyranny.' "This
principle, that the executive, legislative and judicial offices are
independent, co-equal branches of government, is inherent in the
governmental structure of the Commonwealth."16 That the Su-
preme Court's analysis in Plaut is applicable to the retroactive
application of Act 62 is evidenced by the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in that case, as well as exhibited by Pennsylvania law
regarding the separation of powers doctrine.'
175. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 1; DeChastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 (1850);
Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698 (Pa. 1977).
176. Grant v. GAF Corp., 608 A.2d 1047, 1060 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 639
A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1994). See generally John M. Mulcahey, Comment, Separation of
Powers in Pennsylvania: The Judiciary's Prevention of Legislative Encroachment, 32
DUQ. L. REv. 539, 540-44 (1994) (discussing the background of the separation of
powers doctrine in Pennsylvania).
177. The separation of governmental powers into the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches has been inherent in the structure of Pennsylvania's government
since its very beginning. Mulcahey, supra note 176, at 540. The 1776 convention
included this doctrine in the Plan or Form of Government and was continued in
Pennsylvania's Constitutions of 1790, 1838, and 1873. Id. The judiciary's indepen-
dence was protected by article V, section 1 of the constitution which provided:
"[T]he judicial power of the Commonwealth [is] vested in a Supreme Court, in
County Courts of Common Pleas, Oyer and Terminer, and Quarter Sessions, in a
Register's Court, and an Orphans' Court: and in such other courts as the legis-
lature may from time to time establish." Id. (quoting PA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1873)).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made it clear from an early point in
its history that legislative encroachment into judicial affairs would not be tolerated.
The court developed principles to facilitate interpretation of the separation of
powers doctrine under article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution in Greenough v.
Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849). There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted
the separation of powers doctrine found in article V, section 1 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and pointed out that, according to the doctrine, the legislature was
created to enact laws, while the judiciary's function was to interpret them and,
therefore, the legislature was proscribed from exercising judicial power. Greenough,
11 Pa. at 494. Since Greenough, several important decisions have reinforced the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's concern in preventing the legislative branch from
encroaching upon the legislative powers of the judicial branch. See Commonwealth
v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 782 (Pa. 1977) (declaring unconstitutional an act which
mandated the judicial branch to resentence criminals who had been convicted under
the prior act); Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577, 578 (Pa. 1949) (in determining
whether the legislature's regulation of the compensation of court employees un-
constitutionally interfered with the judicial branch, the court emphasized that the
legislature could not overrule a judicial decision or change the effect of judgments
or decrees previously rendered); Hoopes v. Bradshaw, 80 A. 1098, 1100 (Pa. 1911)
(in addressing the constitutionality of a law which provided that an attorney's
admission to practice in the state supreme court would operate to simultaneously
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"Thus, the separation of powers doctrine has evolved into a
powerful check on legislative action," 7' and is used to prohibit
the legislature from enacting laws that conflict with court orders
or decrees or engage in an exclusive judicial function.'79 Inas-
much as Act 62 interferes with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's final judgment in Blue, Act 62 violates the separation of
powers doctrine and is, therefore, unconstitutional. In addition
to Pennsylvania's long line of cases supporting such a conclu-
sion, Justice Scalia's pronouncement in Plaut is directly applica-
ble to Act 62.
CONCLUSION
To this author's gratification, the mounting controversy sur-
rounding Pennsylvania college support law was halted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Curtis. As a matter of
judicial insight, complemented by the wisdom of experience as a
family law practitioner, as a family court judge, and as a parent,
this author regarded Act 62 as intolerable; because not only did
Act 62 trample on our citizens' equal protection rights, it uncon-
stitutionally infringed upon the private domain of the family,
and violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Equally peril-
ous, the Act served to condone a lack of honor and respect in the
parent/child relationship. This author is hopeful that, in the
wake of Curtis, a system of voluntary post-minority educational
support will cultivate closer family relationships, engender
parental respect, and foster social and educational justice in
today's complex society.
admit an attorney to practice in every county in the state, the court, in upholding
the constitutionality of the act, emphasized that the judicial branch had exclusive
control over the admission to the practice of law, but that this legislation was not
an attempt to usurp judicial power as it stated only what effect was to be given to
a purely judicial act); Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446, 448
(1862) (in holding that a law which allowed the gradual reduction in an individual's
prison term based on good behavior violated the separation of powers doctrine and,
thus, was unconstitutional, the court emphasized that the decision interfered with
was an inherent power of the judicial branch).
178. Mulcahey, supra note 176, at 549.
179. Id. at 552.

